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The current low numbers of confirmed COVID-19 cases in Cambodia suggest containment 
efforts have thus far been successful. However, as evident from the experience of other 
countries, there remains a risk that SARS-CoV-2 will begin to circulate widely in the 
population. In the event of transmission becoming widespread to the extent that 
containment is no longer feasible, the country may need to move to a mitigation or 
suppression phase, aiming to reduce transmission, minimise morbidity and mortality, and 
avoid healthcare systems becoming overwhelmed. This study assesses the impact of non-
pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs), specifically those aimed at reducing social contacts, for 
mitigation and suppression of COVID-19 epidemic scenarios in Cambodia. 
 
Approach 
We conducted a scenario analysis using an age-structured transmission model to simulate 
COVID-19 epidemic trajectories over time. The model incorporates provincial-level 
demographic data, and age/setting-specific contact rates based on social mixing patterns data 
from Cambodia. Reductions in transmission and healthcare demands, as compared with 
unmitigated scenarios, were estimated under a range of NPI strategies (specifically: school, 
workplace and public space closures; reducing home visitors; self-isolation of symptomatic 
cases; and shielding of elderly people), implemented alone and in combination. We also 
evaluated strategies for suppression through triggering of intensive, lockdown-type phases 
involving more extreme reductions in contacts outside of home.  
 




● Of the moderate NPIs assessed (i.e., excluding lockdowns), reducing contacts in public 
spaces was estimated to be the single most effective measure for mitigating peak 
healthcare demands. This was followed by reduced home visitors, self-isolation of 
symptomatic cases, and elderly shielding, which were all of comparable effectiveness. 
● School closures and partial workplace closures were projected to have a relatively 
little impact on reducing transmission and peak healthcare demands. 
● Even if used in combination, moderate social distancing interventions were 
insufficient to avoid healthcare, and in particular critical care, demands from far 
exceeding available capacity in most epidemic scenarios. 
● More extreme reductions in social contacts, such as under lockdown-type 
interventions, were projected to reduce transmission by ~60-70%, and thus bring the 
effective reproduction number (Reff) below or close to 1 in all scenarios.  
● Suppression strategies, involving periodic triggering of lockdowns, were projected to 
dramatically reduce peak healthcare demands and cumulative numbers of 
severe/critical cases over a simulated 18-month period. However, in scenarios with 
moderate transmission potential (R0=2.5), we estimated that lockdowns would need 
to be in place for over half of this period in order to keep critical care demands within 
national ICU bed capacity. There was a clear trade-off between the level of 
suppression achieved and the proportion of time under lockdown.  
● In most scenarios, local triggering of lockdowns, at thresholds which consider 
provincial bed capacities, were projected to be more effective than national triggers 
for suppressing peak healthcare demands, particularly in later waves. However, this 
was also projected to increase the duration under lockdown in some provinces. 
● Even under suppression strategies which keep peak healthcare demands within 
national capacity, we estimated that considerable numbers of critical COVID-19 cases 
would not receive appropriate care due to provincial shortages of critical care 
resources (e.g. ICUs, ventilators). 
 
Public health implications 
● Moderate social distancing measures which reduce contacts in public spaces and 
home visitors, along with self-isolation of symptomatic cases, could meaningfully 
reduce (but not control) widespread transmission and mitigate peak healthcare 
demands.  
● Shielding of elderly and other vulnerable people, by limiting their contacts with non-
household members, can also mitigate healthcare, and especially critical care, 
demands in the event of widespread transmission. However, the feasibility of this 
intervention, which may be difficult in multi-generational households, should be 
considered. 
● School closures were estimated to have little impact on transmission potential or 
healthcare demands. This is consistent with modelling evidence from some other 
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settings. In light of this, and the adverse socio-economic impacts of this intervention, 
opening schools is assessed to be of relatively low risk, but should be monitored 
closely.   
● In the event of widespread transmission, moderate social distancing NPIs, even if used 
in combination, are unlikely to prevent healthcare demands from exceeding available 
capacity, unless SARS-CoV-2 transmission potential in Cambodia is lower than has 
been estimated in most other settings. 
● More extreme reductions in social contacts, such as in lockdown-type interventions, 
are likely to reverse epidemic growth, should this occur in Cambodia. Periodic 
triggering of lockdowns could dramatically reduce COVID-19 burden and pressure on 
healthcare systems. However, this type of suppression strategy would pose significant 
challenges: 
o It is likely that lockdowns would need to be triggered frequently, over a 
prolonged period, to keep healthcare demands within capacity, with severe 
socio-economic and health consequences;  
o Suppression through periodic lockdowns would require timely and accurate 
surveillance (e.g. of COVID-19 hospital admissions) across the country; 
o A suppression strategy which keeps healthcare demands within national 
capacity could still result in a disproportionate number of deaths in many 
provinces due to critical care shortages. 
● Strengthening the capacity and resilience of existing healthcare resources,  especially 
the workforce and critical care capacity, is crucial to ensure appropriate care for 
COVID-19 inpatients in any scenario of community transmission, even if suppressed. 
This might involve consideration of innovative safeguarding, resource mobilisation, 
and patient referral strategies. 
● This analysis highlights the challenges of mitigation or suppression in the event of 
widespread SARS-CoV-2 transmission in Cambodia. If the main goal is to avert such 
challenges, sustaining and augmenting containment efforts is of utmost importance. 
Testing, contact tracing and isolation (TTI) strategies were beyond the scope of this 
study (see Limitations). However, evidence from other studies suggest that moderate 
social distancing measures can work synergistically with high-performance TTI 
systems, to both reduce strain on the latter, and increase prospects of containing 
SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks.  
 
Study Limitations  
● Due to low numbers of confirmed COVID-19 cases in Cambodia, most of which were 
imported, model calibration against case data from Cambodia was not possible. This 
study simulates scenarios of community transmission, which has yet to be observed 
in the country. The results are intended to provide evidence on the impact of 
mitigation and suppression strategies in plausible future scenarios, taking into account 
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demographics, social mixing patterns and healthcare capacities in Cambodia, rather 
than model the current situation in the country.  
● Absolute values of model outputs should be interpreted with caution. There remains 
wide uncertainty in a range of key epidemiological and clinical parameters for SARS-
CoV-2/COVID-19, both in general, and in terms of their applicability in the Cambodia 
context. Projected impacts of different NPIs are estimates only. It was not possible to 
make very data-driven assumptions around how the interventions would affect 
contact rates. 
● The model does not capture individual-level variation in transmission or super-
spreader events. These could play an important role in determining epidemic 
dynamics and the success of different control measures, particularly during the early 
stages of an epidemic. 
● The study focusses on NPIs which aim to reduce contact rates in the general 
population. We do not consider other NPIs such as testing, contact tracing and 
isolation (TTI) strategies, which cannot be robustly addressed using the types of data 
and compartmental models used for this analysis. Further evidence is needed to 
identify optimum TTI strategies, both alone and in combination with other NPIs, for 
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The experience of many countries has demonstrated the extreme pressure that COVID-19, 
caused by SARS-CoV-2, can exert on healthcare systems. In countries of the lower Mekong 
region of Southeast Asia, confirmed cases to date have been substantially lower than many 
had anticipated, given their geographic proximity, travel links, and close socio-economic ties 
with China [1].  
  
Clearly, caution is needed when interpreting and comparing reported case numbers, not least 
due to wide variation in surveillance strategies and capacities. Nonetheless, intensive contact 
tracing and isolation, along with other non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) such as 
international border closures, travel restrictions, and physical distancing measures, are likely 
to have played an important role in reducing the spread of SARS-CoV-2 in these countries. 
Other contributing factors may include behavioural, cultural and environmental context, 
younger populations, and experience accrued from preparedness and response activities 
against other emerging infectious diseases, such as SARS and avian influenza A/H5N1. 
However, long-term implementation of more restrictive measures aimed at reducing social 
contacts is socially and economically unsustainable [2]. 
  
Cambodia confirmed its first imported case on 27th January and its first locally acquired case 
on 7th March. With only 139 confirmed cases as of 28th June 2020, and no confirmed deaths 
due to COVID-19, there is little evidence of community transmission in the country [3]. School 
and university closures, along with restrictions on international arrivals, were imposed swiftly 
after the first local confirmed case in March. Additional measures such as partial closure of 
public venues and offices, and temporary restrictions on within country movements, followed 
in April alongside intensive contact tracing and isolation. However, as highlighted by the 
experience of other countries, there remains a risk of transmission becoming widespread, 
particularly as more restrictive measures are lifted. In the event of widespread transmission, 
there is concern that containment strategies such as intensive testing, contact tracing and 
case isolation, may become less feasible and effective unless capacity for such measures can 
be scaled up dramatically [4]. 
  
In light of these risks, and difficult decisions around balancing restrictions with ongoing 
containment, we conducted a scenario analysis using mathematical modelling to assess the 
relative effectiveness of different NPI strategies for mitigation and suppression of COVID-19 
in the event of widespread transmission in Cambodia. We focus here on NPIs which aim to 
reduce social contact rates in the general population. This study was conducted under the 
assumption that there is potential for widespread transmission to occur in Cambodia in 
future, at rates comparable to those estimated in a range of other settings.  
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2. Methods Summary 
 
Methods are described in full in Appendix 1. In brief, we adapted a deterministic  Susceptible-
Exposed-Infectious-Removed (SEIR) model [5], stratified into 5-year age bands up to 65+, to 
simulate epidemic scenarios over time. Given the few reported cases in Cambodia to date, 
most of which were imported, it was not possible to calibrate simulations of generalised 
epidemic scenarios to existing case data from the country.  We therefore accounted for 
uncertainty in the basic reproduction number, R0, by drawing values from a normal 
distribution with mean 2.5 and standard deviation 0.5 (representing a 95% confidence 
interval of 1.5 - 3.5); thus we assume that unmitigated transmission potential in Cambodia 
would fall within the range estimated across other settings [6]. We also compared specific 
scenarios of “moderate”, “low” and “high” transmission potential, through simulations using 
R0 values of 2.5, 1.5, and 3.5, respectively. 
 
Projections of healthcare resource demands were implemented through a stochastic 
compartmental model [6], in which clinical cases have an age-dependent probability of 
developing severe illness (requiring general hospitalisation) or critical illness requiring 
intensive care.  
 
The model incorporates age-specific contact rates in different settings (home, school, work, 
and other settings) based on a contact patterns survey conducted in rural and urban areas of 
Cambodia in 2012 (Appendix Figure A2). Provincial population sizes and demographic profiles 
were based on national census data. National and provincial healthcare resource capacities 
(numbers of beds, ICUs, and HCWs) were based on a survey conducted in 2009 [7,8], 
extrapolated to 2019 population sizes. 
 
We considered a range of intervention strategies, consisting of one or more social distancing 
NPIs which are assumed to reduce contact rates in different settings, as summarised in Table 
1.  To evaluate the relative effectiveness of intervention strategies for mitigation of peak 
healthcare demands during a widespread epidemic, each intervention was simulated alone 
or in combination for a fixed four month period. We also evaluated suppression strategies 
which aim to keep healthcare demands within capacity, through intermittent triggering of 
lockdowns over an 18 month period. In these suppression scenarios, interventions alternated 
between a stringent lockdown phase, and a more ‘relaxed’ phase (during which reduced 
home visitors, elderly shielding, and self-isolation were maintained, but schools, workplaces 
and public spaces were fully open). Trigger thresholds were based on simulated numbers of 









Table 1. Summary of NPIs considered 
Intervention strategy Description 
1. School and university closure Contacts in school and university settings reduced to zero. 
2. Partial workplace closure Workplace contacts reduced by 30%, 24%, and 16% in Phnom Penh, 
other urban, and rural areas, respectively. (Based on workplace 
contacts being reduced by 50% in industry and service sectors, and 
0% in agricultural sector) 
3. Partial public space closure 
(or general social distancing) 
Contacts in ‘other’ settings (outside of home, school or work) 
reduced by 50% 
4. Reduced home visitors Contacts with non-household members at home reduced by 50% 
5. Elderly shielding at home Contacts among over 65s with non-household members reduced by 
75%  
6. Self-isolation of symptomatic 
cases at home 
Symptomatic cases reduce their contacts with non-household 
members by 50%. (Modelled as a 35% reduction in the 
infectiousness of symptomatic cases, based on survey data showing 
that ~70% of social contacts are with non-household members). 
7. Combined (1-6) Simultaneous implementation of interventions 1 to 6 above 
8. Lockdown/intensive 
interventions 
Similar to ‘Combined’ strategy, but with more extreme reductions 
in contacts: 
● Schools and universities closed 
● Work contacts reduced by 79%,72% and 52% in Phnom 
Penh, other urban, and rural areas respectively (based on 
80% reduction in industry and service sectors, 20% 
reduction in agricultural sector) 
● Contacts with non-household members at home and in 
public spaces reduced by 90% 
● Self-isolation of symptomatic cases 
 
3. Results 
3.1. Projections of an unmitigated epidemic in Cambodia  
In an unmitigated epidemic (relating to the unlikely scenario of no control measures), the 
model projected a total of 5.7 million clinical cases (95% projection interval [PI]: 4.2 – 6.2      
million) in Cambodia, with new clinical cases peaking at 0.12 million per day (0.05-0.18 million 
per day). We estimated that 86% (63- 94%) of the Cambodian population would be infected, 
with 43% of infected individuals showing clinical signs. At the peak of an unmitigated 
epidemic, the number of cases requiring hospitalization was projected to be ~48,000 (20,000 
– 69,000), which is 2.5 (1.0- 3.5) times total bed supply in the country. The peak number of 
critical care beds required was 13,000  (5,300 – 19,000) at the national level, which is 13.2      
(5.4- 19.2) times the total estimated capacity of 972 ICU beds in the country.  
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3.2. Impact of non-pharmaceutical interventions on transmission  
The projected impact of each NPI scenario on transmission, based on percentage reduction 
in the basic reproduction number (R0), is shown in Table 2. Results are shown for Phnom Penh 
and Takeo to illustrate differences between urban and rural areas.      Among the six individual 
“moderate” interventions (#1-6), public space closures (or otherwise achieving a 50% 
reduction in contacts outside of home, school, and work), reducing home visitors, and self-
isolation of symptomatic cases were each projected to reduce transmission by at least 11%. 
This was consistent in urban and rural areas, although public spaces closures reduced 
transmission to an even greater degree in Takeo (23%) compared with Phnom Penh (13%). 
This reflects the higher contact rates measured in ‘other’ settings (outside of home, school, 
or work) in rural areas compared to urban areas in the contact survey data (Appendix Figure 
A2). School and partial workplace closures were projected to achieve relatively small 
reductions in transmission (1 to 6%), with workplace closures more effective in urban 
compared to rural areas. 
 
Combining these moderate interventions (#7) was projected to reduce transmission by more 
than 40%. However, for an epidemic with R0=2.5, this combination would not be sufficient to 
bring the effective reproduction number (Reff) below 1. The more extreme reduction in 
contacts in the lockdown scenario (#8) was projected to reduce transmission by around 62% 
in Phnom Penh, and 71% Takeo, which would be sufficient to control transmission with R0 
values of up to 2.6  and 3.4, respectively. 
 
Table 2. Projected impact of physical distancing NPIs on transmission. Values represent the percentage 
reduction in the basic reproduction number, R0, relative to an unmitigated scenario. Estimates are shown for 
Phnom Penh and Takeo to illustrate the difference between the most urban and most rural provinces. 
Interventions are described in Table 1. Cells are colour coded: Blue = higher effectiveness; red = lower 


























3% 6% 13% 11% 1% 13% 42% 62% 
Takeo 2% 1% 22% 13% 2% 13% 46% 71% 
 
3.3. Impact of non-pharmaceutical interventions on peak healthcare demands 
     To assess the relative effectiveness of NPIs for mitigating peak bed demands, we 
conducted simulations in which each intervention was implemented nationwide for a 4 
month period, timed to centre on the peak of an unmitigated epidemic. (In reality, it is unlikely 
that peak timing would be precisely known, or indeed that many of these NPIs would be 
implemented alone; however, the main objective here was to compare their potential for 
mitigating peak healthcare demands).  




The projected number of critical care beds required over time are shown in Figure 1. Projected 
reductions in peak bed demands during the 4 month intervention period for individual and 
combined interventions, in epidemic scenarios with low, moderate, and high transmission 
potential are summarised in Table 3.  
 
In most scenarios, none of the moderate NPIs, even if used in combination, were projected 
to keep critical care demands from far exceeding the national ICU bed capacity (Figure 1). 
While the large reduction in transmission under a lockdown would prevent epidemic growth 
during its implementation, completely releasing this measure and returning to normal 




Figure 1. Projected impact of 4 month interventions on daily critical care bed requirements. “Baseline” = 
unmitigated scenario. Plotted lines represent deciles from 100 simulations (R0 sampled from a normal 
distribution with mean=2.5, sd=0.5); projections R0=2.5 shown in bold. Dotted horizontal lines indicate the 
estimated total number of ICU beds in the country. The shaded pink area represents the 4 month 
intervention period. 
 
The relative reductions in peak healthcare demands under different NPIs followed a pattern 
broadly similar to their effectiveness for reducing transmission. Compared with an 
unmitigated scenario with R0=2.5, a 50% reduction in contacts in public spaces was projected 
to reduce peak bed demands by over a third, while reduced home visitors and self-isolation 
of symptomatic cases each reduced these peaks by over 20% (Table 3). Elderly shielding was 
projected to have a similar impact on critical care demands, despite having little impact on 
transmission, highlighting the importance of shielding groups at high risk of severe disease. 
The relative effectiveness of different NPIs for mitigation was robust to uncertainty around 
R0, although the percentage reductions compared with unmitigated transmission were 
generally larger for low R0 values (Table 3). 
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Table 3. Projected impact of NPIs for mitigating peak bed demands when implemented nationwide, alone or in combination, over a 4 month period. Values show the 
percentage reduction in national peak bed demands during the intervention period (compared with an unmitigated scenario). Intervention scenarios are described in Table 

























Reduction in peak non-ICU beds  3% <1% 32% 21% 12% 21% 81% 98% 
Reduction in peak ICU beds  4% <1% 32% 22% 23% 22% 83% 98% 
          
Low  
(R0=1.5) 
Reduction in peak non-ICU beds  8% 5% 50% 40% 18% 44% 59% 60% 
Reduction in peak ICU beds  8% 4% 49% 41% 33% 44% 60% 61% 
          
High  
(R0=3.5) 
Reduction in peak non-ICU beds  2% <1% 21% 14% 10% 13% 58% 97% 
Reduction in peak ICU beds  2% <1% 21% 15% 18% 14% 60% 97% 
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3.4. Suppression through adaptive triggering of lockdowns 
Although lockdowns were projected to reduce Reff below or close to 1, this intervention 
cannot be implemented indefinitely. Therefore, we simulated the impact of suppression 
strategies involving intermittent triggering of lockdowns at different thresholds over an 18-
month period. The impact of a suppression strategy on bed demands over time for R0=2.5 is 
shown in Figure 2, illustrating the reversal and resurgence of  epidemic growth as lockdowns 
are triggered and relaxed. Local triggering of lockdowns, when the weekly number of COVID-
19 admissions in each province reach a certain threshold relative to the provincial bed 
capacity, was projected to be more effective at suppressing peaks in bed demands, compared 
with nationwide triggering according to national admissions and bed capacities, particularly 
for later waves. This finding was broadly consistent across R0 values and trigger thresholds 
explored, except in the high transmission scenario (R0=3.5), in which national triggers were 
more effective than local triggers at suppressing the initial peak (Table 4, Figure A6). 
 
 
Figure 2. Projected impact of suppression strategies on total hospital bed demands (upper) and ICU bed 
demands (lower) over an 18 month period, for R0=2.5. In the national trigger scenario, nationwide 
lockdown is implemented when weekly COVID-19 hospital admissions reached 3% of the total number of 
beds in the country, and relaxed after falling below the same threshold. In the local trigger scenario, 
lockdowns are triggered independently in each province according to provincial COVID-19 admissions and 
bed capacities. Plotted lines represent 10 model realisations, with the median simulation in bold. Lockdown 
periods are shown in the shaded areas, with heights representing the number of people under lockdown. 
Results for other trigger thresholds and R0 values  are shown in Table 4 and Figure A6. 
 
 
All trigger strategies explored (with thresholds ranging between 0.5% to 5% of the total 
national or provincial hospital bed supply) were projected to dramatically reduce both 
cumulative and peak numbers of severe and critical cases compared with the unmitigated 
scenarios (Table 4). However, there was a clear trade-off: more stringent (i.e. lower) trigger 
thresholds resulted in more effective suppression at the cost of a higher proportion of time 
spent under lockdown.  




For a scenario with R0=2.5, we estimate that national triggering of lockdowns when weekly 
COVID-19 admissions exceeded 3% of the maximum bed capacity (>600 admissions per week) 
would result in peak non-ICU and ICU bed occupancies of around 12% and 80%, respectively 
(not accounting for non-COVID-19 patients). However, this threshold required lockdowns to 
be in place for over half of the 18-month simulation period. It also assumes that some 
moderate interventions (reduced home visitors, elderly shielding, and self-isolation) are 
maintained throughout. Furthermore, the estimated occupancy rates assume referral of 
critical patients to hospitals where ICU beds are available (largely concentrated in Phnom 
Penh). If critically ill patients remain within their home provinces, we estimate that, over an 
18 month period, thousands would not receive appropriate care due to provincial ICU bed 
shortages, even if peak critical cases are suppressed below national ICU capacity. Local 
triggering based on provincial hospital bed capacities, and/or more conservative trigger 
thresholds, could help mitigate but not avert the burden associated with provincial ICU bed 
shortages (Table 4). Geographic disparities are explored further in the next section. 
 
The potential for suppression strategies to keep healthcare demands within national capacity 
was highly dependent on R0. In the low transmission scenario (R0=1.5), all trigger thresholds 
maintained peak critical care demands within national ICU bed capacity, with minimal time 
spent under lockdown. In the high transmission scenario (R0=3.5) none of the trigger 
thresholds prevented peak ICU bed demands from far exceeding national capacity, and even 
non-ICU bed capacities would be severely strained (Table 4). (Although we acknowledge that 
an R0 value this high may be unrealistic for Cambodia, given that community transmission has 
yet to be observed). 
 
 
3.5. Impact of suppression strategies at provincial level 
 
Finally, we compared the impact of national and local triggering of lockdowns on mitigating 
critical care shortages and duration under lockdown at the provincial level. Figure 3 illustrates 
the results for a scenario with R0=2.5, and trigger thresholds at 3% of national or provincial 
hospital bed capacity. In the national trigger scenario, we estimate that in many provinces, 
hundreds of critically ill cases (in some provinces over a thousand) may not receive necessary 
care if they are not referred to provinces with available ICU capacity. Provincial ICU shortages 
were projected to be particularly severe in south-central Cambodia (surrounding Phnom 
Penh), and in the northwest. Local triggering, at thresholds based on provincial hospital bed 
capacity, was projected to reduce, but not avert this burden associated with provincial ICU 
shortages (Figure 3A). In most provinces, the projected duration under lockdown was 
comparable between the national and local triggers. However, some provinces (including 
Phnom Penh) were projected to benefit from shorter durations under lockdown in the local 
trigger strategy, while others might spend significantly longer under lockdown (Figure 3B). 
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Table 4. Projected impact of suppression strategies through adaptive triggering of lockdowns over an 18 month period. In the national trigger scenarios, nationwide 
lockdown was implemented when national weekly COVID-19 hospital admissions (that require ICU or non-ICU) reached 0.5%, 1%, 3%, or 5% of the total number of beds in 
the country, and relaxed after falling below the same threshold. In the local trigger scenario, lockdowns were triggered independently in each province according to provincial 
COVID-19 admissions and bed capacities. Elderly shielding, reduced home visitors, and self-isolation were maintained throughout. Cells are colour coded: Blue = higher 




a Critical cases not admitted to ICU = the projected number of critical cases who do not receive ICU treatment due to provincial ICU shortages (i.e. if patients are not referred 
between provinces) 
b Peak bed/ICU bed occupancy = the projected peak number of hospital beds/ICU beds needed for COVID-19 patients as percentage of the total number of beds/ICU beds in the 
country (if patients are referred between provinces when needed)
National 0.5%Local 0.5% National 1% Local 1% National 3% Local 3% National 5% Local 5% 
Total critical cases 70,888 3,735 4,207 7,111 6,636 15,813 14,272 22,077 19,108
Critical cases not admitted to ICU
a
68,529 224 706 1,678 1,308 7,991 4,833 13,736 8,569
Peak non-ICU beds required 35,330 509 502 849 825 2,190 1,955 3,363 2,881
Peak ICU beds required 13,010 187 179 309 286 766 674 1,141 991
Peak bed occupancy
b
191% 3% 3% 5% 4% 12% 11% 18% 16%
Peak ICU bed occupancy
b
1336% 19% 18% 32% 29% 79% 69% 117% 102%
Proportion of time under lockdown 0% 74% 72% 68% 69% 57% 58% 49% 50%
Total critical cases 44,224 759 464 1,335 889 2,672 2,218 5,404 3,333
Critical cases not admitted to ICU
a
36,715 8 20 39 53 318 243 1,843 422
Peak non-ICU beds required 10,670 122 68 225 129 550 323 858 498
Peak ICU beds required 3,804 42 23 72 44 175 101 267 160
Peak bed occupancy
b
58% 1% 0.4% 1% 1% 3% 2% 5% 3%
Peak ICU bed occupancy
b
391% 4% 2% 7% 5% 18% 10% 27% 16%
Proportion of time under lockdown 0% 11% 12% 10% 10% 5% 6% 2% 4%
Total critical cases 78,030 27,354 28,369 29,564 30,422 36,720 36,440 40,701 40,239
Critical cases not admitted to ICUa 76,350 20,784 19,658 23,779 23,750 30,693 29,925 34,774 34,556
Peak non-ICU beds required 52,259 3,703 4,811 5,421 6,003 8,766 9,549 8,735 12,319
Peak ICU beds required 19,437 1,405 1,761 2,040 2,219 3,201 3,406 3,201 4,342
Peak bed occupancy
b
283% 20% 26% 29% 33% 47% 52% 47% 67%
Peak ICU bed occupancy
b
1996% 144% 181% 209% 228% 329% 350% 329% 446%
Proportion of time under lockdown 0% 86% 77% 80% 72% 67% 57% 64% 47%














Figure 3. Comparison of national and local triggering of lockdowns on provincial critical care shortages and 
proportion of time under lockdown, for R0=2.5.  In the national trigger scenario, nationwide lockdown is 
implemented when national weekly COVID-19 hospital admissions (that require ICU or non-ICU) reached 3% of 
the total number of beds in the country, and relaxed after falling below the same threshold. In the local trigger 
scenario, lockdowns are triggered independently in each province according to provincial COVID-19 admissions 
and bed capacities. (A) The cumulative number of critical cases which do not receive ICU due to provincial 
shortages (if they remain within home province), over the 18 month simulation period. (B) The percentage of 
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4. Discussion  
 
The current low numbers of confirmed COVID-19 cases in Cambodia suggest containment 
efforts have been successful, and may also point to lower transmissibility of the virus in this 
setting. However, as the country seeks to lift more restrictive measures, there remains a risk 
that SARS-CoV-2 will begin to circulate widely in the population. In the event of transmission 
becoming widespread to the extent that containment is no longer feasible, the country may 
need to move to a mitigation or suppression phase, aiming to reduce and delay transmission, 
minimise morbidity and mortality, and avoid healthcare systems becoming overwhelmed.  
 
Our modelled scenarios suggest that, even if used in combination, moderate social distancing 
interventions and self-isolation of symptomatic cases would be unlikely to maintain health 
resource demand below capacity in the event of widespread transmission in Cambodia, 
unless transmission potential is lower than has been observed in most other settings. In 
particular, school and partial workplace closures were projected to have minimal impact on 
peak healthcare demands when implemented alone. This is broadly consistent with 
projections in other countries using similar modelling approaches [6,9], and a recent review 
of evidence on the impact of school closures [10]. 
 
Schools have been closed in many countries, including Cambodia. In light of wide 
uncertainties around the role of children in transmission of COVID-19, and the detrimental 
social and health impacts of school closures, the value of this intervention has been the 
subject of much debate [11]. Recent evidence suggests that children are less susceptible not 
only to severe clinical illness, but also to infection [12], and both of these factors were 
incorporated into our model. However, even when relaxing assumptions around reduced 
infectiousness of subclinical cases, and age-varying susceptibility to infection, school closures 
were projected to have a relatively small impact. We caution that our model may 
underestimate the impact of this intervention if, for example, contacts at school were under-
reported in our contact survey data compared with contacts in other types of settings. 
Furthermore, the model results should not be interpreted as suggesting that risk of 
transmission clusters associated with schools, or indeed workplaces, is necessarily low. But 
they do suggest that contacts in these settings might contribute relatively little to overall 
transmission during a generalised epidemic in Cambodia.  
 
Although unlikely to avoid healthcare, and particularly critical care, demands from far 
exceeding capacities in Cambodia, our findings show that moderate social distancing 
measures which reduce contacts in public spaces and home visitors, along with self-isolation 
of symptomatic cases, could still meaningfully reduce transmission and peak healthcare 
demands during a mitigation phase. Shielding of elderly and other vulnerable people, by 
limiting their contacts with non-household members, is also important to reduce healthcare, 
and especially critical care, demands. However, the feasibility of, and public compliance with, 
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these measures should be considered. For example, while elderly shielding has the potential 
to significantly reduce health service pressure and mortality, it would require high levels of 
adherence and may be difficult to implement in multi-generational households [13]. 
 
If an epidemic takes off in Cambodia, we estimate that more extreme reductions in contacts, 
such as under a lockdown scenario, may be necessary to reduce the reproduction number 
below or close to 1 in most scenarios. This is consistent with experience and analyses in many 
countries with community transmission, where the effective reproduction number only fell 
below 1 following the implementation of intensive interventions [14,15]. Because such 
extreme measures impose profound socio-economic burdens and secondary adverse effects 
on health, and may lead to a rebound in cases when lifted, suppression strategies, involving 
periodic triggering of intensive interventions have been proposed as an alternative strategy 
[16,17].  
 
Our results show that suppression via periodic lockdowns could substantially reduce the 
health burden of COVID-19 in scenarios of community transmission in Cambodia. However, 
this strategy would likely require frequent triggering of lockdowns, over a prolonged period, 
if it is to reliably maintain healthcare demand below national capacities. Furthermore, due to 
wide geographic disparities in healthcare resources in Cambodia, many provinces would 
struggle to provide the necessary care for critically ill patients, even if healthcare demands 
are suppressed below national capacity. Local triggers, using thresholds which take into 
account provincial health resource capacities, could help mitigate this to some degree. 
However, this would rely on sufficiently timely and accurate surveillance, for example of 
COVID-19 hospital admissions, across the country. Local triggering may also require some 
provinces to spend even longer under lockdown than a national trigger strategy.  
 
While it may be possible to refer critical patients in provinces surrounding Phnom Penh to 
better resourced hospitals in the capital, this could present a greater challenge in more 
remote rural provinces. Strengthening the capacity and resilience of existing healthcare 
resources, especially the workforce and critical care capacity, is crucial to ensure appropriate 
care could be provided for COVID-19 inpatients in all scenarios of community transmission, 
even if suppressed. This might involve consideration of innovative safeguarding, resource 
mobilisation, and patient referral strategies. 
 
4.1. Study limitations and further considerations 
The compartmental transmission model used in this study does not capture individual-level 
variation in transmission, which recent evidence suggests is high for COVID-19 [18]. This can 
result in super-spreading or stochastic extinction, which play an important role in disease 
dynamics and the success of control measures when case numbers are low. On the other 
hand, the role of superspreader events in triggering explosive epidemics [19] further 
highlights the need for countries which have yet to observe widespread transmission to 
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continue to prepare for a mitigation/suppression phase, which was the scenario under 
investigation in our study. 
 
The study focussed on NPIs which aim to reduce contacts in the general population. We do 
not consider more targeted NPIs such as testing, contact tracing and isolation (TTI). These 
cannot be robustly addressed using the type of data and compartmental models used for this 
analysis. Further work is needed to identify optimum TTI strategies in resource limited 
contexts for controlling SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks, both alone and in combination with other 
NPIs.  
 
There is increasing evidence that contacts in indoor spaces pose a substantially higher risk of 
transmission than outdoors [20–22]. Other than households, settings such as worker 
dormitories, meat packing plants, and religious gatherings have been linked to numerous, 
sometimes large, COVID-19 clusters [20,23]. In the Cambodian context, the large number of 
factories (for example associated with garment manufacturing) could be one of the settings 
to be prioritised, where working environments could generate superspreading events.  
 
Early detection and containment of transmission clusters could enhance prospects of averting 
the generalised epidemic scenarios modelled here. However, evidence from other studies 
show that even high performance TTI systems may struggle to contain SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks 
unless used in combination with other NPIs, such as moderate physical distancing measures 
[24–26]. The latter can also reduce strain in TTI systems by reducing the number of tests  
needed, the number of contacts that need to be traced, and the number of people under 
quarantine [26,27]. 
 
The choice of R0 values in this study were informed by a meta-analysis on of estimates [6], 
and cover the range of estimates of the time-varying reproduction number (prior to 
implementation of intensive measures) in other Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia 
and the Philippines [28,29]. With such low reported case numbers in Cambodia, model 
calibration to country data was not possible, nor was a retrospective analysis  to assess the 
relative impacts that previous or ongoing interventions have had.  Although uncertainty in R0 
would impact the model projections in terms of the absolute numbers of health resources 
required, it would have less impact on the relative effectiveness of the different NPIs 
modelled here.  
 
We used weekly COVID-19 hospital admissions as an adaptive trigger and assumed the 
completeness of these data would be a week delayed. While COVID-19 admission data was 
considered to be more feasible to collect, and less prone to under-reporting, than other 
indicators such as a number of infected individuals, it has its own limitations. The accuracy of 
this indicator is likely to exhibit spatio-temporal variation in relation to epidemic progression 
and surveillance and testing capacities. 




The above caveats, along with uncertainty around other parameters and assumptions, such 
the serial interval, hospital/ICU length of stay, and the impact that NPIs would have on 
reducing social contacts, mean that the absolute values from our model projections should 
be interpreted with caution. Many parameters were informed by evidence from other 
countries, and may differ in the Cambodia context. For example, our estimates of the age 
varying proportion of cases requiring hospitalisation and critical care, and hospital/ICU length 
of stay, are based largely on data from China and Europe [6,30,31]. It is possible that younger 
age-groups in Cambodia and LMICs may be at higher risk of complications from COVID-19 
than in high income settings, due to a higher prevalence of risk factors [13].   
 
4.2. Conclusion 
Should widespread transmission occur in Cambodia, it would present profound challenges for 
the country’s healthcare system. In a mitigation phase, moderate measures aimed at reducing 
social contacts, particularly in public spaces and with home visitors, along with self-isolation 
of symptomatic cases and protecting elderly and vulnerable populations, could meaningfully 
reduce healthcare demands. However, such measures alone are unlikely to prevent 
healthcare systems becoming overwhelmed. More intensive measures, such as periodic 
triggering of lockdowns if and when COVID-19 hospital admissions rise, could dramatically 
suppress the burden and healthcare demands. However, these would likely need to be in 
place frequently, and over a prolonged period, to keep healthcare demands within available 
capacity. Such an approach would also rely on sufficiently timely and accurate surveillance 
indicators to inform when to trigger and relax intensive interventions, and would need to be 
balanced against the adverse social, economic and health burdens imposed by restrictive 
lockdowns. Sustaining and augmenting containment measures, which thus far appear to have 
been successful in Cambodia, are of utmost importance to try to avert, or at least further 
delay, the challenges of COVID-19 mitigation and suppression highlighted by this study.  
 
Availability of data and material 
Simulation codes can be found here. https://github.com/arata-
hidano/Covid19_Cambodia/tree/master/Cambodia_model/codes  
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Appendix 1 – Detailed Methods 
Disease transmission model 
We adapted a deterministic Susceptible-Exposed-Infectious-Removed (SEIR) transmission 
model developed by Prem et al., [5], introducing a pre-clinical infectious compartment in 
alignment with recent models evidence on infectiousness prior to symptom onset [32] (Figure 
A1). The model is stratified into 5-year age bands up to 65+, allowing for heterogeneous 
contact rates between age-groups. Infectious individuals are either pre-clinical, clinical or 
asymptomatic with recovered individuals becoming immune at the end of the infectious 
period. SEIR dynamics were implemented at provincial level, while a metapopulation 
approach was used to implement population mobility between provinces. The latter was 
based on a radiation model, and reported frequencies of travelling outside one’s home 
provinces in the Cambodia contact survey. Population mobility between provinces was 
implemented for 17 weeks after seeding, after which the impact of mobility on the disease 
trajectories was negligible. All simulations were seeded with 10 cases in each age group in 
Phnom Penh.  
 
Figure A1. Schematic of the disease transmission and combined health resource model Following infection 
with SARS-CoV-2, susceptible individuals (S) enter a latent period (E) and then become infectious, either with 
preclinical (Ip) and then clinical infection (Ic) or subclinical infection (IA), after which they are no longer infectious 
(R). The clinical course for individuals with clinical COVID-19 infection was then simulated using a stochastic 
health resource needs model, in which a proportion of clinical cases become severe (requiring 
hospitalisation;Bedi) or critical (requiring intensive care; ICUi). 
 
 
The equations for the transmission model are as follows: 
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Where 𝛽is the baseline transmission parameter, 𝐶𝑖,𝑗,𝑘  describes the contacts of age group 𝑖 
made by age group 𝑗 at location 𝑘 , 𝜎𝑖is the age-specific susceptibility. Both asymptomatic and 
symptomatic cases contribute to transmission, 𝜌𝑖denotes the probability of an infected case 
eventually developing clinical signs and 𝛼 is the relative infectiousness of asymptomatic 
individuals. 𝜇 = 1 −𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−1/𝑑𝐸) is the daily probability exposed individuals become 
infectious, with 𝑑𝐸  representing the duration of the latent period. 𝜃 = 1 −𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−1/𝑑𝑃) is 
the daily probability at which pre-clinical individuals become clinical with 𝑑𝑃 being the 
duration of the preclinical period before showing clinical signs. 𝛾𝐼𝐴 = 1 −𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−1/𝑑𝐴) 
and 𝛾𝐼𝐶 = 1 −𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−1/𝑑𝐶) are the daily probabilities that infectious asymptomatic and 
clinical individuals recover, respectively. We assume that the progression of clinical cases to 
severe or critical illness, and their subsequent hospitalisation status,  does not impact upon 
transmission dynamics. 
 
Heath resource model 
Projections of healthcare resource demands were implemented through a stochastic 
compartmental model, in which clinical cases have an age-dependent probability of 
developing severe or critical illness requiring hospitalisation or critical care, respectively. The 
progression of clinical cases to severe/critical illness, and their subsequent hospitalisation 
status, is assumed not to impact upon transmission dynamics (following [6]). The number of 
serious cases requiring hospitalisation during each time-step was drawn from a binomial 
distribution 𝐵𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑎𝑙(𝜃𝐼𝑖,𝑡
𝑃 , 𝛿𝑖), where 𝜃𝐼𝑖,𝑡
𝑃  is the number of individuals in age group 𝑖 with 
newly developed clinical symptoms and 𝛿𝑖 is the probability that clinical patients developing 
severe symptoms requiring hospitalisation in age group 𝑖. The amount of time between 
symptom onset and hospital admission, and the amount of time between hospitalisation and 
death/discharge for ICU and non-ICU cases were drawn from gamma distributions (Table A1).  
 
Key model parameters 
Model parameters are presented in Table A1. Given the few reported cases in Cambodia at 
the time of this study, most of which are imported, it was not possible to calibrate simulations 
of generalised epidemic scenarios to case data from the country.  We therefore explored the 
uncertainty in unmitigated transmission scenarios by drawing R0 values from a normal 
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distribution with mean 2.5 and standard deviation 0.5, representing a 95% confidence interval 
of 1.5 - 3.5. This was informed by the posterior distribution of R0 estimates in a recent meta-
analysis [6]; thus we assume that unmitigated transmission potential in Cambodia is 
comparable to that observed across other settings. We assumed that susceptibility to 
infection with COVID-19 (𝜎), probability of clinical signs among those infected (ρ) and 
probability of developing severe clinical signs after symptom onset (δ) were all age-
dependent [12,30]. Subclinical cases were assumed to be half as infectious as pre-clinical and 
clinical cases (with the latter two states considered equally infectious) [6]. 
 
Table A1. Model parameters  
Parameter Description Value/distribution Notes/Reference 





𝐶𝑖,𝑗,𝑘 Contact rate between an individual in age group i 
and individuals in age group j at a given location 
type k 
(per day) Estimated (contact 
survey) 



















𝛼 Relative infectivity of subclinical cases compared to 
preclinical and clinical cases 
0.5 Assumed [6] 
𝑑𝐸  Duration of latent (pre-infectious) period   4 (days) [13] and references 
therein 
𝑑𝑃  Duration of preclinical infectious period  1.5 (days) Assumed to be 30% of 
average infectious 
period [13] 
𝑑𝐶  Duration of clinical infectious period  3.5 (days) Calibrated with dE and 
dP to give mean serial 
interval of 6.5 days  
[13] and references 
therein 
𝑑𝐴 Duration of subclinical infectious period 5 (days) Assumed to be the 
same as the infectious 
period of clinical cases  
(𝑑𝑃 + 𝑑𝐶) 
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𝜌𝑖 Proportion of clinical cases among infected 








































Derived from: [6,30] 

















𝑑𝐻  Delay from symptom onset to hospital admission 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎(𝜇 = 7, 𝑘 = 7) [6] 
𝑑𝐵𝑒𝑑  Duration of hospitalisation for severe (non-ICU) 
patients 
𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎(𝜇 = 6.44, 𝑘
= 1.73) 
Fitted to median and 
IQRs in [31] 
𝑑𝐼𝐶𝑈  Duration of hospitalisation for critical (ICU) patients 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎(𝜇 = 8.23, 𝑘
= 2.07) 
Fitted to median and 
IQRs in [31] 
 Duration of supplemental oxygen requirement for 
severe (non-ICU) patients 
5.44 (days) 1 day less than LOS 
 Duration of supplemental oxygen requirement for 
critical (ICU) patients 
7.23 (days)  1 day less than LOS 
 Proportion of critical (ICU) patients that require 
invasive mechanical ventilation 
0.72 [33] 
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 Minimum HCW: patient ratios needed in ‘surge 
mode’ 
Nurses per ICU patient day 
Doctors per ICU patient day 
Nurses per non-ICU patient day 








 Estimated oxygen requirement per critical patient 
per day (PSA plant per day; Bulk liquid per day) 
Estimated oxygen requirement per severe patient 








Contact matrices  
Province-specific contact matrices describing contact rates between different age groups 
were generated from a survey of social mixing patterns carried out in urban and rural areas 
of Cambodia in 2012 (Figure A2). This survey involved 2,016 participants in four provinces 
(Phnom Penh, Kandal, Kampot, and Kratie), in which contacts were defined as either a two-
way conversation in the physical presence of another person, or physical contact. From these 
data, we included physical contacts, or conversational contacts not shorter than 15 mins, 
assuming that these were most relevant for disease transmission. Separate matrices were 
generated for people living in urban and rural locations, and according to the social setting in 
which the contact took place: at home with household members, at home with non-
household members, at work, at school/college, or in other settings, using the same age 
bands as for the transmission model. Matrices were weighted to account for non-
representative sampling in the contact survey. An adjustment was applied to account for 
oversampling of people reporting contacts made on weekends, and of non-employed 
participants using age and location specific employment rates reported in the 2012 
Cambodian Socio Economic Survey (National Institute of Statistics, 2013). Finally, matrices 
were adjusted to make them symmetric using the 2013 demographic data. All matrices were 
generated using the R package ‘socialmixr’ v.0.1.6 [37]. 





Figure A2. Age-mixing matrices in urban and rural areas of Cambodia at home (with household members), home 
(with non household members), work, school, and other settings. Matrices show the mean number of daily 
contacts adjusted for an average day in the week. 
 
Estimation of healthcare resource demands  
The daily oxygen need for patients in each severity category was calculated based on WHO 
recommended flow rates [36], and we assumed that severe and critical patients would 
require supplemental oxygen for one day less than their average duration of hospitalization. 
We assumed 72% of ICU patients would require invasive mechanical ventilation [33]. To 
estimate the numbers of healthcare workers (HCWs) needed, HCW:critical (ICU) patient ratios 
were based on optimal ICU staffing capacity estimated by  Carenzo et al. [34]. For the acute 
medical unit (non-ICU) staffing needs we adopted the assumptions made in a pandemic 
influenza modelling study by Rudge et al. [35]. 
 
Demographics and health resource data  
Provincial  population sizes were based on 2019 census data. Since age-stratified data by 
province were not available from this census, demographic profiles were based on projections 
made in 2017 (National Institute of Statistics, 2008a, 2019 & 2017). Total health resources 
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including the number of inpatient and ICU beds, nurses and doctors in each province were 
estimated by extrapolating data collected in 2009 to 2019 population sizes [7,8], assuming 
that health resources per capita remained constant between the two periods (Supplementary 
Figure A3).   
 
 
Figure A3: Provinces in Cambodia and health resource capacities in each province [7,8]. (Top left) The capital, 
Phnom Penh is colored in red and Takeo in blue. Each number represents one province; 1 Banteay Meanchey, 2 
Battambang, 3 Kampong Cham, 4 Kampong Chhnang, 5 Kampong Speu, 6 Kampong Thom, 7  Kampot, 8 Kandal, 
9 Kep, 10 Koh Kong, 11 Kratie, 12 Mondul Kiri, 13 Oddar Meanchey, 14 Pailin, 16 Preah Sihanouk, 17 Preah 




We considered a range of intervention strategies, consisting of one or more social distancing 
NPIs assumed to reduce contact rates between individuals in specific settings or, in the self-
isolation strategy, infectiousness of symptomatic individuals (Table 1). Adjusted contact 
matrices were generated for each intervention strategy, reducing baseline contact rates at 
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school, work, home and ‘other’ settings. We assumed that school closure and partial public 
space closures would reduce contacts in school and other settings to 0% and 50% of baseline, 
respectively. As our contact survey data recorded whether contacts made at home were with 
household members or non-household members, we also simulated “reduced home visitor” 
scenarios involving 50% reduction in home contacts with non-household members. 
 
Strategies involving workplace closures and advice to work from home are likely to be less 
feasible in some sectors, particularly among agricultural workers due to the need to maintain 
food production and supply chains. Under moderate social distancing strategies involving 
partial workplace closure/work from home, we assumed that workplace contacts could not 
be reduced among agricultural workers, but could be reduced by 50% in industry and service 
sectors. In a more extreme lockdown scenario, we assumed that workplace contacts could be 
reduced by 20% among agricultural workers, and 80% among industry and service sectors 
(Table 1). Contact matrices for reduced workplace contacts in each province were then 
weighted according to province-level employment rates in each of these sectors. The latter 
were inferred based on national socio-economic survey data for urban and rural populations 
of Cambodia (National Institute of Statistics, 2018), and urban:rural population ratios for each 
province.  
 
For simulating an elderly shielding strategy, we assumed that individuals aged 65 and older 
are advised to stay at home with reduced visitors from other households, thereby reducing 
their contacts outside of home, and with non-household members at home, to 25% of 
baseline. In scenarios including self-isolation of symptomatic individuals, we reduced the 
infectiousness of symptomatic individuals to 65%. (Similarly to Davies et al. [6], contact 
patterns data from Cambodia indicate that approximately 70% of contacts occur either 
outside the home, or with non-household members while at home, and we assumed that self-
isolation could reduce these contacts by 50%). 
 
To assess the rudimentary impacts of intervention scenarios, each intervention was applied 
for a period of four months, timed to coincide with the peak incidence in the unmitigated 
scenarios. We also explored the impact of adaptive interventions, alternating between a 
stringent lockdown phase, and a ‘relaxed’ phase (during which reduced visits to other 
households, elderly shielding, and self-isolation were maintained, but schools, workplaces 
and public spaces were fully open). We simulated different thresholds for triggering and 
relaxing lockdowns, both at a national and local (provincial) level. We used the number of 
new hospital admissions in the previous week (hereafter referred to as new admissions) as 
the trigger, and assumed a one-week delay in the completeness of hospital admission 
reporting for any given week. Lockdown was implemented when the number of new 
admissions reached a certain threshold relative to the total number of beds in the country for 
the national trigger scenario, or in each province for the local trigger scenario. A relaxed phase 
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Appendix 2 – Additional Results  
Uncontrolled disease trajectories in each province 
The incidence of infected cases has its peak at different timings in each province because we 
used a meta-population model in which the initial infected cases were only seeded in 
Phnom Penh. Figure S3 is a realisation of one simulation using R0 = 2.5.  
 
 
Figure A4. Projected daily incidence of infected cases in each of 25 provinces in an unmitigated 
scenario for R0=2.5. 
 
Sensitivity analysis of the impact of key assumptions on model projections  
At the time of writing, the relative infectiousness of asymptomatic individuals, and variation 
in susceptibility by age group, it still unclear. There is also uncertainty around how risk of 
transmission varies with intensity and duration of contact. A sensitivity analysis was carried 
out by estimating reductions in R0  through social distancing measures under the following 
assumptions (1) asymptomatic individuals are as infectious as symptomatic individuals or 50% 
a infectious, (2) susceptibility is constant across age groups or age-dependent, and (3) contact 
matrices based on all reported contacts regardless of duration, or on physical contacts, and 
non-physical contacts lasting at least 15 mins. As shown in Figure A5, these assumptions had 
minimal impacts on the estimated reductions in R0  to reductions in contact rates in each 
setting. 




Figure A5. Sensitivity analysis of model assumptions for the projected effectiveness of interventions for 
reducing transmission. Red and blue lines represent Phnom Penh and Takeo, respectively.  
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Table A2. Additional model outputs for the projected impact of suppression strategies through adaptive 
triggering of lockdowns, over an 18 month period. In the national trigger scenarios, nationwide lockdown is 
implemented when national weekly COVID-19 hospital admissions (that require ICU or non-ICU) reached 0.5%, 
1%, 3%, or 5% of the total number of beds in the country, and relaxed after falling below the same threshold. In 
the local trigger scenario, lockdowns are triggered independently in each province according to provincial 
COVID-19 admissions and bed capacities. Elderly shielding, reduced home visitors, and self-isolation were 

















Local      
5% 
Infection attack rate (%) 86 4 5 9 8 21 19 30 26
Total clinical cases 5,673,077 297,400 365,218 601,091 570,320 1,419,157 1,244,523 2,016,980 1,700,312
Total critical cases 70,888 3,734 4,206 7,111 6,636 15,812 14,272 22,076 19,108
Total severe cases 232,381 16,569 19,310 32,370 30,428 73,578 65,688 103,422 89,007
Peak of daily incidence 285,020 4,164 3,679 7,833 6,177 19,469 14,908 30,921 21,738
Peak of daily clinical incidence 122,174 1,700 1,598 3,166 2,667 7,972 6,413 12,647 9,407
Peak non-ICU beds required 35,330 509 502 849 825 2,190 1,955 3,363 2,881
Peak ICU beds required 13,010 187 179 309 286 766 674 1,141 991
Peak HCWs required 59,362 835 809 1,377 1,316 3,521 3,121 5,337 4,620
Peak nurses required 43,636 614 595 1,014 966 2,584 2,289 3,913 3,388
Peak doctor required 15,729 221 214 364 350 937 832 1,423 1,232
Peak ventilators required 9,367 135 129 222 129 552 129 822 129
Infection attack rate (%) 55 1 1 2 2 4 4 9 5
Total clinical cases 3,667,257 82,000 67,263 139,457 106,116 271,559 238,964 571,542 348,360
Total critical cases 44,224 758 464 1,334 888 2,672 2,218 5,404 3,333
Total severe cases 151,996 3,712 2,431 6,572 4,534 13,207 11,201 27,267 16,828
Peak of daily incidence 81,173 1,038 581 1,819 1,060 4,438 2,463 6,955 3,662
Peak of daily clinical incidence 35,201 448 250 787 458 1,930 1,071 2,998 1,597
Peak non-ICU beds required 10,670 122 68 225 129 550 323 858 498
Peak ICU beds required 3,804 42 23 72 44 175 101 267 160
Peak HCWs required 17,557 185 101 344 198 848 486 1,295 752
Peak nurses required 12,901 136 74 252 146 621 355 948 551
Peak doctors required 4,661 49 27 93 53 227 130 348 201
Peak ventilators required 2,739 30 17 51 17 126 17 192 17
Infection attack rate (%) 95 32 33 35 36 46 45 51 50
Total clinical cases 6,210,546 2,154,485 2,239,744 2,363,120 2,429,753 3,033,483 2,985,455 3,390,944 3,341,626
Total critical cases 78,030 27,354 28,369 29,564 30,422 36,720 36,440 40,700 40,239
Total severe cases 251,576 119,968 124,424 130,514 134,020 163,428 161,999 181,622 179,586
Peak of daily incidence 442,674 24,603 33,623 37,627 42,154 74,639 73,307 74,639 95,353
Peak of daily clinical incidence 188,290 11,002 14,855 16,355 18,642 30,293 31,455 30,293 41,247
Peak non-ICU beds required 52,259 3,703 4,811 5,421 6,003 8,766 9,549 8,735 12,319
Peak ICU beds required 19,437 1,405 1,761 2,040 2,219 3,201 3,406 3,201 4,342
Peak HCWs required 88,275 6,288 8,050 9,210 10,076 14,580 15,772 14,563 20,172
Peak nurses required 64,905 4,628 5,914 6,774 7,409 10,718 11,584 10,706 14,807
Peak doctors required 23,377 1,664 2,135 2,440 2,667 3,865 4,187 3,862 5,366















Figure A6. The impact of national and local trigger scenarios on hospital bed demands over time. (A) 
Hospital bed demands (median and 95% projection interval). The dotted lines indicate the assumed 30% 
surge capacity. (B) ICU bed demands (median and 95% projection interval). The dotted lines indicate the 
assumed the maximum ICU capacity in the country. Shaded areas show lockdown periods, with heights 
representing the population under lockdown. 




Figure A7. The impact of national and local trigger scenarios on health resources over time. (A) The 
number of HCWs required over time in each scenario (median and 95% projection interval). The dotted 
lines indicate the assumed surge capacity for doctors (light blue), nurses (red) and their total (green).  (B) 
The number of ventilators required over time (median and 95% projection interval). The dotted lines 
indicate the total number of ventilators estimated in the country. 




Figure A8. Daily oxygen needs estimated in adaptive trigger interventions. (A) Liquid oxygen, and (B) 
PSA plant oxygen. Plots show medians and 95% projection intervals. 
